The literature on time perception is discussed. This is done with reference both to the ''cognitive-timer'' model for time estimation and to the subjective experience of apparent duration. Three assumptions underlying the model are scrutinized. I stress the strong interplay among attention, arousal, and time perception, which is at the base of the cognitivetimer model. It is suggested that a multiplicative function of two key components (the number of subjective time units and their size) should predict apparent duration. Implications for other cognitive domains are drawn, and in particular an analogy is suggested between apparent duration and apparent movement.
INTRODUCTION
Consider a paradox of time perception noted by William James a century ago in his chapter on ''The Perception of Time'' (1890, Ch. 15) : ''In general, a time filled with varied and interesting experiences seems short in passing, but long as we look back. On the other hand, a tract of time empty of experiences seems long in passing, but in retrospect short'' (italics in original). James suggested an explanation which has a modern ring (p. 624): ''The length in retrospect depends obviously on the multitudinousness of the memories which the time affords. Many objects, events, changes, many subdivisions, immediately widen the view as we look back. Emptiness, monotony, familiarity, make it shrivel up.'' This insight has been followed-up by the now familiar distinction between retrospective (i.e., without prior awareness) and prospective paradigms of time estimation Hicks, Miller, & Kinsbourne, 1976) , the various methods of time estimation (Carlson & Feinberg, 1970; Hornstein & Rotter, 1969) , and by models of time perception focusing on contextual change (Block, 1989) and the segmentation of experience (Poynter, 1989) .
While the prospective-retrospective paradox has thus been addressed, and while this has led to specific models for time perception (for reviews, see Block, 1990; Fraisse, 1984; Friedman, 1990; Macar & Jackson, 1992) , the wider implications of this research have been somewhat overlooked. This is the case both for the modeling of time perception and for its proper embedding within cognitive theory. Even a cursory glance at any recent textbook in cognitive psychology will reveal that the study of temporal cognition is not of major concern. This is rather surprising, given the fact that time perception is a cognitive construct (Jones & Boltz, 1989; Ornstein, 1969) with affinities to such conventional areas as attention (Brown, 1985) , memory (Block, 1985) , perception (Allan, 1979) , and representation (Freyd, 1987) . Conceivably, the reason for this sorry state of affairs is that cognitive psychology needs to enlarge its scope and delve into the nature of consciousness (Natsoulas, 1999) , thereby returning to the starting point of our discipline, well acknowledged by James (1890) . The consciousness revolution in psychology (Hilgard, 1980) has, indeed, finally made its impact, as readers of Consciousness and Cognition well know. That temporal cognition and experience are intricately related to questions of consciousness (Block, 1979) goes without saying. Time perception or cognition and its phenomenology deserve wider coverage and a more integrative review than perhaps current research can provide. I endeavor to fuel the reader's imagination by speculating on how one particular model, the ''cognitive-timer'' model, can be extended in order to put the phenomenology of time back into the study of temporal cognition.
I look at the literature via the lens of the ''cognitive-timer'' model for time perception, with which I am associated (Glicksohn, 1992 (Glicksohn, , 1996 Glicksohn, Mourad, & Pavell, 1991 . I begin by taking a critical look at the three assumptions underlying the cognitive-timer model and end by suggesting that a multiplicative function of two key components should predict apparent duration. Along the way implications for other cognitive domains are drawn. In the article the distinction between a model and a metaphor for apparent duration becomes blurred. This is a deliberate strategy, for as Black (1962) has argued:
To many, the use of models in science has strongly resembled the use of metaphors. . . . A memorable metaphor has the power to bring two separate domains into cognitive and emotional relation by using language directly appropriate to the one as a lens for seeing the other . . . Much the same can be said about the role of models in scientific research. . . . They too bring about a wedding of disparate subjects, by a distinctive operation of transfer of the implications of relatively well-organized cognitive fields. And as with other weddings, their outcomes are unpredictable. Use of a particular model may amount to nothing more than a strained and artificial description of a domain sufficiently known otherwise. But it may also help to notice what otherwise would be overlooked, to shift the relative emphasis attached to details-in short, to see new connections. (pp. 236-237) This article has a speculative-theoretical bent. To my mind, the issues raised by James (1890) have not been adequately dealt with in the literature, due to the fact that dominant models in the field, including the cognitive-timer model addressed below, are too mechanistic in scope to be able to adequately describe the experience of time. What is required is a more organic, dynamic, gestalt-oriented conceptualization, one that is concerned with both process and experience of time perception (Brown, 1991) . Speculations, however, have to have some basis, and the cognitivetimer model provides an excellent springboard for the imagination.
The Cognitive-Timer Model
The cognitive-timer model rests on three assumptions (e.g., Glicksohn, 1996) : (1) The very existence of a cognitive timer whose purpose it is to process and generate temporal information; (2) this temporal information is processed by the timer by storing the number of subjective time units which have accumulated during a given interval; and (3) attentional resources are allocated continuously to enable both temporal and nontemporal information processing, with a trade-off in allocation between the cognitive timer and other cognitive modules. These three assumptions seem to be well founded in both research and theory. Various authors have posited the existence of a cognitive timer (e.g., Zakay, 1989; see Block, 1990 , for a survey), alternatively termed an ''internal clock'' (Treisman, 1963) , or a ''pacemaker and accumulator'' (Allan & Gibbon, 1991) , or as Macar (1993, p. 112) has recently put it, ''the convenient metaphor . . . is not a clock, but a family of chronometers that can be started, stopped, and reset at will.'' The cognitive timer can be with (Glicksohn & Myslobodsky, in preparation; Hoagland, 1933; Rammsayer, 1997; Treisman, Cook, Naish, & MacCrone, 1994) or without (Zakay, 1993a) neurobiological implications, having either a constant (e.g., invariant over method of estimation) or a variable rate of functioning (Allan & Gibbon, 1991; Carlson & Feinberg, 1968; Fetterman & Killeen, 1990; Macar, Grondin, & Casini, 1994; Treisman, 1963; Treisman & Brogan, 1992; Treisman et al., 1994; Treisman, Faulkner, Naish & Brogan, 1990; Zakay, 1989) . The notion has been put to empirical test by looking at how arousal manipulations can alter the timer's rate of functioning (Adam, Rosner, Hosick, & Clark, 1971; Aitken & Gedye, 1968; Cahoon, 1969; Frankenhaeuser, 1959; Glicksohn, 1992 Glicksohn, , 1996 Penton-Voak, Edwards, Percival, & Wearden, 1996; Treisman et al., 1990 Treisman et al., , 1992 Treisman et al., , 1994 Zakay, Nitzan, & Glicksohn, 1983) .
A number of theorists have commented on the second assumption, concerning the process of accumulating subjective time units to generate a time estimation (Fortin & Breton, 1995; Fortin, Rousseau, Bourque, & Kirouac, 1993; Macar et al., 1994; Zakay, 1989; , though the issue is still rather vague. Zakay (1989, p. 368) suggested that the less attention is allocated to the cognitive timer, the fewer the number of subjective time units which are accumulated (see also Thomas & Brown, 1974; Thomas & Weaver, 1975 , for an earlier exposition of this idea). From this statement, it would seem that the subjective time units are not equivalent to the pulses generated and accumulated by the cognitive timer, as described by the ''internal clock'' theorists referenced above. Rather, the flow of subjective time units is more dependent on attention than on arousal level. Macar et al. (1994, p. 674) extended this notion, suggesting that ''. . . each time attention is detracted from the timer, a certain number of pulses are lost.'' That is to say, ''The less attention paid to temporal processing, the more pulses will be lost, whether the pulses are simply not recorded by the counter or are subsequently erased from it'' (p. 677). As Macar et al. (1994, p. 674) acknowledge, however, the nature of the pulses ''. . . that are assumed to be stored . . . remains quite speculative.'' A more radical hypothesis can be entertained (Macar et al., 1994, pp. 683-684) : ''Perhaps the timer is not even activated when attentional resources are not allocated to it.'' This suggests that attention fuels the timer, which works independently of fluctuations in arousal level. Fortin et al. (1993, p. 536 ) have adopted this stronger claim, suggesting that the accumulation process ''. . . is under the control of a gate that enables the accumulation while in an 'on' state. . . . The gate is seen as being under attentional control. . . . Concurrent nontemporal processing would put the gate in an 'off' state, and would temporarily interrupt the accumulation process. Accumulation would resume after the completion of nontemporal processing.'' Thus, in this view attention serves as a gate, actually switching the timer on or off. In the attentional-gate model of Zakay and Block (1997) , in contrast, such an attentional gate does not switch the timer (pacemaker) on or off; rather, it simply allows pulses to be registered. Furthermore, the timer can be influenced by arousal. Another strong claim has been expressed by Zakay (1993a, p. 99) , who suggests that the effect of diverting attention from the cognitive timer is ''. . . to slow the activity of the cognitive timer and to produce subjective time units which correspond to longer objective durations.'' Clearly, then, a great degree of speculation abounds, none of which seems to be charting out the path for constructive research.
Perhaps one encouraging fact is that despite the aversion of the use of a counting strategy by subjects in psychophysical studies of time estimation (note the request not to count off time in a number of studies; e.g., Eisler & Eisler, 1992) , counting does improve accuracy of the time estimation (Fetterman & Killeen, 1990) . Conceivably, counting would be a cognitive strategy that is arousal-dependent (Frankenhaeuser, 1959) , but also attention-focusing, and could serve the (theoretically) useful purpose of coordinating between the pacemaker notion of a cognitive-timer and that of an attention-dependent counting of subjective time units.
The bulk of current research has addressed the third assumption of the model, investigating the trade-off between temporal processing and concomitant nontemporal processing. As a research strategy, this seems to be a wise choice: It is much easier to investigate a dual-task situation in the laboratory than it is to probe hypothetical models in the hope of pinpointing the hypothesized attentional gate or to establish whether the size of the hypothesized subjective time unit is indeed invariant of arousal level. The trade-off between temporal and nontemporal processing is necessarily incurred by the sharing of attention (Brown, 1985; Brown & Stubbs, 1988 Fortin et al., 1993; Hicks, Miller, Gaes, & Bierman, 1977; Macar, 1993; Sawyer, Meyers, & Huse, 1994; Thomas & Weaver, 1975; Zakay, 1993a Zakay, , 1993b Zakay, Nitzan, & Glicksohn, 1983) . The current consensus is that the cognitive-timer model seems to be quite adequate in explaining data gathered from within the prospective paradigm (Fortin et al., 1993; Macar et al., 1994; Zakay, 1989 Zakay, , 1993a . It is, however, debatable whether the model can explain data gathered from within the retrospective paradigm or whether the latter should be affiliated with a memory-based model (Block, 1990 (Block, , 1992 Brown & Stubbs, 1988 Brown, Stubbs, & West, 1992; Zakay, 1989 Zakay, , 1993b .
Time Perception and Attention
This notion of a cognitive timer relies on two rather slippery constructs, each of which has its own problematic literature: Arousal level (for a critical review, see Claridge, 1981) and attention (for a scathing analysis, see Allport, 1980 ). Yet, it would seem that not all advocates of a cognitive-timer model address the need for considering an arousal-dependent rate of functioning. Some avoid the issue (e.g., Zakay, 1993a , though see , others raise the issue (e.g., Glicksohn, 1992 Glicksohn, , 1996 , and others have investigated the issue (Penton-Voak, Edwards, Percival, & Wearden, 1996; Treisman, 1984; Treisman et al., 1990 Treisman et al., , 1992 Treisman et al., , 1994 . The bulk of research associated with the cognitive-timer model has not looked in earnest at this problem, focusing instead on that other slippery concept of attention. In a sense, this is a good strategy because the construct of attention is a key factor defining one's orientation within cognitive psychology. And like any construct, it has seen its own vagaries of definition and multiplicity of models. Kahneman (1973) was not the first theorist to suggest that attention was like a fuel, sustaining cognitive processing (variously termed ''capacity,'' ''attentional resource,'' and ''effort''). Rapaport (1967) is the unacknowledged original proponent of a notion of attentional energy (that is, after Freud, within the ego-psychological tradition, cf. Schwartz & Schiller, 1967) , who had suggested that there may be a number of pools of attention that may be selectively utilized by the cognitive system (and thus foreshadowing contemporary discussions of ''multiple resources''). Nevertheless, Kahneman's (1973) primary contribution lay both in interpreting the body of research on attention in terms of attentional deployment and in suggesting that attention and arousal were codependent. Division of attention would be possible if competing cognitive activities made demands compatible with available resources. If one activity (the ''primary task'') required extensive attention, then less would be available for the secondary task, assuming that both tapped a common pool of attention. This is the basis for the expectation that temporal processing and nontemporal processing should covary in a negative fashion: The more attention devoted to nontemporal cognitive processing (e.g., by increasing task demands), the less will be available to the cognitive timer for temporal processing, resulting in a biased time estimation. This prediction has been made and supported in a large number of studies, using various tasks and varying time measures (e.g., Brown, 1985; Fortin et al., 1993; Glicksohn et al., 1991 Glicksohn et al., -1992 Macar et al., 1994; Rammsayer & Lima, 1991; Sawyer et al., 1994; Zakay, 1989 Zakay, , 1993a Zakay, , 1993b Zakay et al., 1983) .
One wider implication of these data concerns the unresolved debate as to whether a notion of general capacity would be sufficient here (Kahneman, 1973) or whether a notion of multiple attentional resources would be more compatible with research findings (Allport, 1980; Eysenck, 1982; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Pribram, McGuinness, & Sanders, 1983; Wickens, 1980) . It would seem from the time perception literature that the overwhelming bulk of data support a single attentional pool, yet this finding has not been appreciated by workers in the field of attention, who seem to be oblivious to the research on time estimation. Thus within a prospective paradigm, wherein the subject is aware that he or she will subsequently be asked to provide a time estimate in addition to performing a concurrent cognitive task (e.g., listening to music), the experimental condition comprises a dual-task situation. The two tasks should always compete (following Kahneman, 1973) because neither is effortless or automatic. Despite what has been suggested regarding the circularity of Kahneman's theory (Allport, 1980) , this prediction does hold up with respect to time estimation, as discussed earlier. Navon (1984 Navon ( , 1985 has carefully delineated reasons why the notion of attentional division (or, in his terms, attention sharing) may be superfluous in general. But in the particular domain of time perception, these reservations do not seem to hold.
Thus, following Navon (1984) , one does see the effects on time estimation of (1) motivation level (Langer, Wapner, & Werner, 1961; Thorn & Hansell, 1993) , 2) task difficulty (Brown, 1985; Sawyer et al., 1994; Zakay et al., 1983 ), (3) task complexity (Boltz, 1991; Hogan, 1978; Ornstein, 1969) , and (4) dual-task deficit (Fortin & Breton, 1995; Fortin et al., 1993; Macar et al., 1994) . Furthermore, even though one aspect of temporal processing (judgment of frequency) has been considered by Hasher and Zacks (1979) to be an effortless process (but see Sanders, Gonzalez, Murphy, Liddle, & Vitina, 1987) , by their own criteria the major bulk of temporal processing would seem to suggest the active involvement of attention (see Jackson, 1990 , for a relevant discussion). All of these results support the strong interplay between attention, arousal, and time perception. But, what exactly is the nature of such attentional deployment?
Attentional Deployment and Absorption
In addition to the sharing of attention between the cognitive timer and other cognitive modules, one should consider the form that this attentional deployment takes. Note that ''attention'' is a theoretical construct in cognitive psychology. Thus, following Black (1962) , a model and a metaphor for attention can be wed (see Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 1999 , for a relevant discussion). I suggest a familiar metaphor taken from research on visual attention, that of the ''spotlight of attention'' (e.g., Driver, 1996; Posner, 1980) or ''zoom lens'' (e.g., Usai, Umiltà, & Nicoletti, 1995) . The notion is not new and can be found in the writings of such authors as Hernández-Peón (1964), Vernon (1966), and Wachtel (1967) with respect both to attention and to the related concepts of awareness and consciousness (see also Galin, 1994) . What is new in the present discussion is the reference of this attentional beam. The predominant focus of contemporary work on attention has been on externally oriented attention; consider, however, the spotlight metaphor in regard to internally oriented attention (e.g., Hunt, 1989; Hunt & Chefurka, 1976; Singer, 1966 Singer, , 1975 . By this I mean becoming focused and absorbed in ongoing cognitive activity. Some subjects should be able to become more absorbed in their nontemporal processing than others, with clear effects on apparent duration (Glicksohn et al., 1991 (Glicksohn et al., -1992 .
Absorption has primarily been viewed as a personality trait anchored on the capacity for imaginative involvement (Roche & McConkey, 1990; Tellegen, 1981 Tellegen, , 1982 Tellegen, , 1992 Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) . But, absorption also refers to a state of absorbed attention. A number of authors have commented on the relationship between the state of absorption and apparent duration. Aside from the comments of William James (1890) mentioned earlier, consider a number of quotations. Woodrow (1951 Woodrow ( , p. 1231 , whose experimental repertoire included both psychophysical methods and introspection, observed that ''Situations especially favorable to an experience that is subjectively timeless are those characterized by intensely absorbing occupations, such as reading an interesting novel, contemplating the beautiful hallucinations produced by some drugs, or battling for one's life.' ' Hicks et al. (1977, p. 442 ) made reference to McTaggart (1927, p. 277) , who had suggested ''. . . that when 'we pay as much attention to time in a short period as we should usually pay in a longer period, we tend to judge the period to be longer.' While absorbed in some activity, conversely, 'we have little attention to spare for the lapse of time, and so we judge that little time has elapsed.' '' More recently, Michon (1985, p. 38) noted that ''an absorbing theatre performance, an exciting holiday, or a romantic evening have a content . . . so absorbing that little or no attention remains for the temporal cues . . . that such events might in principle provide. The resulting immediate judgment therefore tends to severely underestimate the actual duration. '' McKellar (1968) has made the following observation:
Absorption in events seems to go with negative error; attention to the passage of time seems to go with positive errors. We make negative errors when we burn the toast we are making, when we get lost in the conversation and allow our coffee to get cold, and when we think we have time to get home but night overtakes us. By contrast, we commit positive errors when making tea and meditating on the proverb 'the watched kettle never boils' or when in listening to a dull lecture a surreptitious glance at our watch provokes the regretful 'It's earlier than I thought. ' (p. 177) As an aside, this oftly commented on fact, that ''the watched kettle never boils,'' while referred to by authors working within the cognitive-timer model (e.g., Zakay, 1989, p. 371) , has also been commented on by Ornstein (1969) , the proponent of a memory-based model for retrospective duration. In what seems to be a shift in his thinking regarding his ''storage-size'' metaphor, he writes:
An old saying has it that, 'A watched pot never boils.' Why does it seem so? It seems readily interpretable along storage size lines if we consider that expectancy is a situation which leads to increased sensitivity to stimuli, that as we continually 'watch' the pot, that we are more vigilant than usual. An increase in vigilance should result in a greater amount of awareness of input, and consequently a lengthening of duration experience. (p. 112) This suggests that apparent duration (Ornstein's duration experience, which is distinct from his usual, retrospective duration) is positively related to absorption (though perhaps only in reference to a prospective paradigm). This also suggests that prospective time estimation can serve as an index of the degree of absorbed involvement in a task. Indeed, Treisman (1963, p. 28) had suggested that''. . . temporal estimation tasks might prove useful as a method for assessing the state of vigilance of an observer.'' Alternatively, prospective time estimation qua secondary task in a dual-task situation can be used to assess concurrent workload level and/or the relative amount of available attentional resources (Zakay, Block, & Tsal, 1999) . Note, however, that absorbed involvement and attentional demands are far from synonymous. Paraphrasing an example from Kahneman (1973) , if you are asked to complete a relatively simple task of mental arithmetic, your performance will not improve on my announcing that I am holding a gun up to your head. The reason for this is that the task demands are not great. If you are also asked to provide a prospective time estimate of task duration, then I would suggest that in this particular case this would be a better index of absorbed involvement in the task (due to threat) than to workload level (minimal). Thus, while attentional demands are task-related, absorbed involvement is experientially based (Crawford, Brown, & Moon, 1993; Wild, Kuiken, & Schopflocher, 1995) . Indeed, Tellegen (1981) has suggested that one can either adopt an instrumental approach (task-related) or an experiential one (absorption). In relating attentional deployment to absorption, I am suggesting that prospective time estima-tion is directly concerned with ongoing experience in addition to concurrent cognitive processing.
A state of absorption can be induced by such techniques as meditation (West, 1987b; Pekala, 1987) and hypnosis (Fellows, 1986; Fromm, 1977 Fromm, , 1979 Hilgard, 1979; Sheehan & Bayliss, 1984) . Using such techniques, one can check to see whether the experimental manipulation has a systematic effect on apparent duration. This was the strategy adopted by a number of authors, particularly with respect to hypnosis (Sheehan & Bayliss, 1984; St. Jean & MacLeod, 1983; St. Jean, McInnis, Campbell-Wayne, & Swainson, 1994; St. Jean & Robertson, 1986) . However, the nature of the absorption-hypnosis relationship is problematic (Council, Kirsch, & Hafner, 1986; Glisky, Tataryn, Tobias, Kihlstrom, & McConkey, 1991; Kumar & Pekala, 1988; Monteiro, Macdonald, & Hilgard, 1980; Nadon, Hoyt, Register, & Kihlstrom, 1991) . Furthermore, a recent study looking at hypnotic underestimation of duration in terms of attentional allocation (St. Jean et al., 1994) , while supporting the cognitive-timer model, has failed to show a distinction between hypnotic and nonhypnotic contextual effects on apparent duration. Turning to the literature on meditation may therefore be a more profitable strategy for developing a better understanding of the relationship between attentional deployment and apparent duration.
Meditation, like hypnosis, entails an experimental manipulation of both attention and arousal level (Corby, Roth, Zarcone, & Kopell, 1978; Davidson, 1976; Davidson & Goleman, 1977; Elson, Hauri, & Cunis, 1977; Fischer, 1971; Pagano & Warrenburg, 1983; Schuman, 1980; Shapiro, 1982; West, 1987a) . While various techniques do exist (Naranjo & Ornstein, 1971) , I focus on concentrative meditation, also known as contemplative meditation or, following Naranjo (Naranjo & Ornstein, 1971, Ch. 2), absorptive meditation. Block (1979, p. 208) has noted that the experienced duration of a meditation period is shortened compared to physical time, which, following William James, would suggest that the period is filled with ''varied and interesting experiences.'' Block's interpretation is to the contrary: ''Attention to the passage of time is usually greatly minimized or absent, perhaps because concentrative meditation techniques involve attending to a single stimulus, such as a mantra or a physical movement.'' From Ornstein's writings (Naranjo & Ornstein, 1971; Ornstein, 1969 Ornstein, , 1975 , it is clear that retrospective duration is constructed from the contents of memory (Ornstein's, 1969 , ''storage-size'' metaphor for retrospectively constructed subjective duration), while the goal of meditation (irrespective of technique) is to deconstruct one's state of consciousness (e.g., Ornstein, 1975) , thereby altering our temporal experience. A number of authors have suggested that meditation enables a reinvestment of attention into perception (Deikman, 1972a (Deikman, , 1972b (Deikman, , 1977 Naranjo & Ornstein, 1971) , variously termed deautomatization, dishabituation, or defamiliarization (cf. Goodblatt & Glicksohn, 1989 ). Ornstein's (1969, p. 45 ) comments are of interest: ''There are other ways to change the information in the register without physically manipulating the actual stimulus array. The awareness of the observer may be changed so that he attends to more or less of the stimulus array.''
Perhaps the most detailed analysis of the meditative path has been provided by Brown (1977) , and his conclusions are of especial importance for the present discussion:
The meditators appear to repeat the stages of information-processing in reverse. . . . To the extent that the phenomenologies are valid, it appears that the yogi, through concentration, learns to discern each stage in information-processing in the construction of his world. One might wonder how the yogi is able to discern components of information-processing that happen very quickly for the normal person. The reader will recall that one of the nonspecific effects of meditation is a subjectively sensed slowing down of mental operations over time. (p. 262) Consider, therefore, the notion of an attentional beam directed inward (see Fig. 1 ). Assuming a common pool of attention, there is a trade-off between externally oriented and internally oriented attention. The more absorbed the subject becomes in his or her subjective experience (due to a predisposition for high absorption and/or via an experimental technique such as introspection or concentrative meditation), the slower time appears to be. Internal events seem to be flowing by in slow motion, as fewer subjective time units are accumulated (hypoarousal), each of which is larger in extent (hypoarousal).
Note that the model depicted in Fig. 1 is an experiential, process-oriented one (cf. Brown, 1991) and not a structural one comprising such familiar components as a pacemaker, attentional gate, and accumulator (cf. Block, Zakay, & Tsal, 1999; Macar, 1993; Treisman, 1963; Treisman et al., 1990 Treisman et al., , 1994 . I assume all of the structural components implicated by the cognitive-timer model and its continuing development (Zakay, Block, & Tsal, 1999) , while still preferring, following Kahneman (1973) , a process-oriented depiction of attentional deployment (or attentional involvement) to one pinpointing structural bottlenecks in the flow of temporal information. Furthermore, given that model and metaphor are perhaps inherently entwined in such a formulation (Black, 1962) , the very notion of an attentional beam could be embodied as a single entity (cf. Fernandez-Duque & Johnson, 1999), part of which is directed at external events (or, rather, at the internal representation of external events) and the other to internal events that remain in the background (Singer, 1966) . It is not the case that such a diagram would be inappropriate: Such a model would contrast focal attention with the fringe (cf. Galin, 1994) and has always been popular in the literature. Figure 1 , however, explicitly contrasts externally oriented attention, which in Tellegen's (1981) terms would be reflective of instrumental processing, to internally oriented attention, which, following Tellegen (1981) , is characterized by absorbed involvement in ongoing experience. I turn now to discuss such an absorbed involvement in temporal flow.
Attentional Deployment and Time Estimation
Perhaps William James's (1890) stream of consciousness would be an apt metaphor for this temporal flow; after all, time and consciousness are intimately entwined (Block, 1979; Natsoulas, 1992 Natsoulas, -1993a Natsoulas, , 1992 Natsoulas, -1993b Ornstein, 1975) , and time does have a dynamic quality expressing movement (Glicksohn & Ron-Avni, 1996; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989) . James conceived the stream of consciousness (or train of thought) as comprising substantive parts (the resting places) and transitive parts (places of flight). As Natsoulas (1992 Natsoulas ( -1993b . 378) has suggested from his reading of James, ''. . . we tell time off in pulses not because time itself is a pulsational reality, but because our consciousness of it is in the form of discrete pulses of mentality.'' In present terms, I would argue that these pulses (e.g., Kristofferson, 1980) have both extension (the size of the subjective time unit) and intension (their number). It is my proposal that apparent duration is a multiplicative function of these factors, taking the following form: apparent duration ϭ size of subjective time unit (S) ϫ number (n).
With an increase in arousal, the number of subjective time units increases (Treisman, 1963) ; with an increase in externally oriented attention (due to the competition for attentional resources), the size of the subjective units decreases (Zakay, 1989) . Now, Wachtel (1967, p. 423) had suggested that the attentional spotlight should have both an arousal-dependent width (width decreasing as arousal increases) and an arousal-dependent focus (focus shifting as arousal increases). In a hyperaroused state, the spotlight for externally oriented attention can become both narrower in width and jittery, resulting in cognitive breakdown (Reed, 1972, pp. 27-28 ). At a more normal level of arousal, there would be a better degree of focused attention. As FernandezDuque and Johnson (1999, p. 96) have noted with respect to the spotlight metaphor, the spotlight should have homogeneous intensity and be of fixed size. Given that the spotlight for externally oriented attention is arousal dependent (e.g., Eysenck, 1982; Kahneman, 1973) , it is quite plausible that the spotlight for internally oriented attention would also be arousal dependent, with a (normally) necessary trade-off between the two-increasing arousal level, resulting in a narrowing of the focus of attention to external stimulation and a widening attention to internal stimulation (cf. Singer, 1966 Singer, , 1975 .
In concentrative meditation, there is both an increase in internally oriented attention and a reduction in arousal level (Schuman, 1980; West, 1987b) . In such a hypoaroused state, the spotlight for externally oriented attention might become relatively fixed (minimal attention to external stimulation) and the spotlight for internally oriented attention might thereby become wider while remaining stable, which would be indicative of a more efficient allocation of attentional resources to internal stimulation. This should therefore result in both a decrease in the number of subjective time units and an increase in the size of the subjective time unit. The width of the beam should therefore increase substantially (Fig. 1) . The flow of time thus becomes slower, and each ''frame'' can be inspected longer (Mandler, 1975) . Timelessness would then be the limiting case of a single extended frame packed with information.
A direct implication of this is that within a prospective paradigm, the more focused internally is one's attention (introspection, meditation, etc.), the slower the rate of functioning of the cognitive timer, coupled with larger subjective time units. Time will therefore seem long in passing, as James commented (and as best assessed using the method of production-the expectation here is for longer productions). Time will also seem short on retrospective reflection, as James noted, because retrospective time estimation (e.g., verbal estimation-the expectation here being for smaller estimations) has a different attentional quality (less absorption). That is to say, while retrospective and prospective time estimations might entail different cognitive mechanisms (Zakay et al., 1999) , they also entail different degrees of attentional involvement in ongoing experience, namely absorption (Crawford et al., 1993) . Note that this suggestion, relying on the notion of absorption, is markedly different from the explanation put forth by James (see p. 1) and by subsequent authors who have stressed the distinction between prospective and retrospective conditions (e.g., Block, 1992; Zakay, 1993b) . The present explanation is more in line with the suggestion made by that retrospective and prospective conditions are actually more similar than dissimilar. A great number of subjective time units, coupled with a minimal size of the subjective time unit would reflect a fast rate of functioning of the cognitive timer (see also Brown, 1991, p. 140) . Figure  2 attempts to give a graphic portrayal of this multiplicative function, while holding to the general tenets of the cognitive-timer model.
Essentially the same type of multiplicative function holds for another common phenomenon of perceptual experience: apparent motion. Gestalt psychology was officially launched with Max Wertheimer's analysis of apparent motion comprised of alternating flashes of lights (Robertson, 1986) . When the lights alternate at a critical frequency, the perceptual experience is one of a movement of light from one point to the other. Clearly, there is nothing moving-yet our perceptual experience derives from the perceptual organization imposed on this situation. Apparent motion is an emergent quality, not reducible to single flashes of light. Apparent duration, theoretically derived from a train of subjective time units, is in a way similar to the emergent quality of apparent motion (Geissler, Schebera, & Kompass, 1999) . Apparent motion breaks down as the interstimulus interval (ISI) increases (ISI Ͼ 200 ms), resulting in the perception of a succession of flashes and not their temporal integration (Sekuler, 1996) . Apparent duration breaks down as one becomes more and more absorbed in one's subjective experience due to the lengthening of the subjective time unit, focusing on single ''frames'' of experience (Mandler, 1975) at the expense of their temporal integration. Apparent duration also breaks down in psychopathology as a function of attentional deficits and hyperarousal (Melges, 1982) .
The breakdown of apparent duration results in the experience of timelessness (see, e.g., descriptions of timelessness from subjects experiencing near-death, in Grof & Halifax, 1977) . In fact, there are two theoretical ways to achieve the state of timelessness. As suggested above, one path is via meditation (hypoarousal), inducing a longer and longer subjective time unit, which becomes the limiting case of the flow of time as all attentional resources are allocated in inward reflection (Fig. 2) . But consider the case of hyperarousal (e.g., extreme stress, such as experienced in neardeath situations; cf. Siegel, 1980) . As the train of subjective time units accelerates, with each subjective time unit becoming smaller and smaller in extension, then the limit is reached, much as when a temporal ''critical flicker fusion'' is realized (Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1960) . The individual subjective time units then become fused into one. Such an hypothesis has theoretical support from other quarters: Fischer (1971) , for example, has argued that the path of hyperarousal will flip-flop into the path of hypoarousal, and Glicksohn (1992) has argued that extended exposure to perceptual overload (hyperarousal) will eventually cause the cognitive system to ''crash,'' resulting in the timer slowing down (due to subsequent hypoarousal). Flaherty (1999) has recently discussed such protracted duration, noting the paradox of this being the result of either extremely high or extremely low levels of stimulus complexity (this is consistent with an analysis of these situations in terms of perceptual overload and perceptual underload, as discussed by Glicksohn, 1992) . And yet the situations which bring on such protracted duration, as discussed by Flaherty (1999) , are the very same circumstances which might result in timelessness: Suffering and intense emotions, violence and danger, altered states of consciousness, concentration and meditation, and shock.
The novel idea in this article is that the state of timelessness can be viewed as the limit for the functioning of the cognitive timer, achieved by the same multiplicative function (number of subjective time units ϫ size of subjective time units), as one constituent of this relationship progressively increases while the other progressively decreases. Specifically, as the number of subjective time units progressively increases while the size of the subjective time unit decreases or as the number of subjective time units progressively decreases while their size increases. Now, if apparent duration is similar to apparent movement, as suggested above, then one might expect a fair degree of compatibility among motion perception, space perception, and time perception. The literature reveals remarkable parallels among these domains that are worthy of discussion.
Parallels among Time Perception, Motion Perception, and Space Perception
Various authors have remarked on the parallels between time perception and space perception (e.g., Poynter, 1989; Thorndyke, 1981) . One source from which comparisons have been drawn is the psychophysical literature on distance estimation and time estimation. Using Stevens' power law as a basic reference (see, e.g., Algom, 1992) , one finds that the exponent for both tasks is typically close to 1 (for distance estimation, see Hartley, 1981; Wagner, 1985 ; for time estimation, see Allan, 1983; Eisler, 1976; Glicksohn, 1996) . Figure 3 presents as a visual aid the psychophysical function, expressed in terms of the multiplicative function presented above. Conceivably, one might be able to distinguish between the size of the subjective time units and their number by analyzing difference scores for the measure constant (see Glicksohn, 1996 , for such an analysis). Given an experimental manipulation which does not affect attention, but does result in a change in arousal (e.g., a mild stressor), ∆ (intercept) would reflect a change in the number of subjective time units [i.e., ∆ log(n AR )]. Given an experimental manipulation which does not affect arousal, but does result in a change in attention (e.g., instructions), ∆ (intercept) would reflect a change in the size of the subjective time units [i.e., ∆ log(α AT )].
Relying on the cross-domain similarity noted earlier, Thorndyke (1981) has suggested that it would be reasonable to suppose that the same cognitive process underlies both judgments. This is one attractive possibility that will be broached later. A less forceful statement would be that the two processes are somehow interdependent. Indeed, at the micro level, one finds space-time dependencies (the tau and the kappa effects; cf. Jones & Huang, 1982) . At the macro level, one also finds space-time dependencies whereby the scale of physical space has an influence on perceived dura -FIG. 3 . Psychophysics of apparent duration (prospective paradigm). Applying Stevens' power law, S AT (Size of subjective time unit) ϭ α AT ϫ Dur βAR where β AR Ϸ 1.00 and refers to the individual arousaldependent rate of functioning of the cognitive timer and α AT is the measure constant which reflects attentional deployment. On substitution in the multiplicative function, T ϭ n AR ϫ S AT ϭ n AR ϫ α AT ϫ Dur βAR ; taking logs, log(T) ϭ log(n AR ) ϩ log(α AT ) ϩ β AR log(Dur). Carlson and Feinberg (1970) disregard the measure constant (here, log(n AR ) ϩ log(α AT )), assuming that the height of the latter is determined by ''extraneous response variables.'' In the present view, as long as arousal level stays approximately constant, the measure constant (intercept) will be determined by the level of attentional deployment: As attention to time increases, α AT decreases and should reach 0 (veridical perception); as attention decreases, or is detracted from the time, α AT increases Macar et al., 1994). tion (the smaller the scale, the shorter the produced duration; cf. DeLong, 1981; Mitchell & Davis, 1987) .
The influence of ''clutter'' (spacing of events or locations) on time estimation and distance estimation is also comparable. In the temporal domain, a cluttered interval (which could also be a ''filled'' one) appears longer than an empty one (Allan, 1979; Fraisse, 1984) , though the effect may change as a function both of the size of the interval (i.e., less or more than 10 s) and of the paradigm of time estimation (Predebon, 1996) ; in the spatial domain, a cluttered extent is judged longer than an uncluttered one (Baird & Hubbard, 1992; Sadalla & Staplin, 1980; Thorndyke, 1981) . Poynter (1989) further notes that for both domains, more segmented intervals are retrospectively judged to be longer, as are intervals containing more complex events.
Given these parallels between the temporal and spatial domains, it would be feasible to explore the possibility of applying a model from one domain to the other. Thorndyke (1981, p. 543) has applied a cognitive-timer model to the spatial domain using the model to analyze his findings regarding distance estimation: ''Assume that when the subject scans along a route, the scan process activates an internal clock or timer. At the end of the scan, the clock is stopped, and the clock time indicates the elapsed scan time and, indirectly, the accumulated distance. The time can then be compared to the scan time for the standard modulus to convert the time estimate into a mileage estimate.'' Thus, a distance judgment is generated using time estimation as a base.
An alternative would be to use a distance estimation to generate a temporal measure. This is the strategy adopted by Kosslyn (e.g., 1978 Kosslyn (e.g., , 1980 in his studies of mental imagery. As he writes (Kosslyn, 1978, p. 374) : ''To encourage actual scanning along the entire extent of the line, we asked the subjects to imagine a tiny black speck flying as quickly as possible along its length to the other end. . . .'' The temporal measure (here, reaction time) is a function of traversed extent. This is the same strategy employed by other researchers in the spatial domain. For example, Hanyu and Itsukushima (1995) have recently reported a study on cognitive mapping, employing in addition to a measure of distance estimation both a measure of traversed time estimation and a mental walking task. For the latter, participants were requested ''. . . to imagine target routes and measure the duration of . . . mentally walking through the routes'' (p. 582). Essentially the same type of measure was used to study what Algom and Cohen-Raz (1987) have termed ''cognitive velocity.'' When participants are required to make a distance estimation, they are presumed to mark off segments using an internal standard and then count off the number of segments thus marked (Hartley, 1977 (Hartley, , 1981 . Similarly, in the temporal domain, when participants are required to make a time estimation, they are presumed to mark off the number of subjective time units corresponding to the required interval (Zakay, 1993b) .
Some General Implications
The difference between prospective and retrospective paradigms for time estimation should now be reexamined given these parallels between the spatial and temporal domains. First, one should consider just how similar the two really are. have come out forcefully in favor of their basic similarity. As they write, . . . both types of judgments are disrupted by nontemporal task demands, both increase with increases in physical duration, both are affected by the order in which stimulus intervals are presented, and both are affected by the surrounding stimulus context. . . . These common features suggest that, despite a number of striking differences, prospective and retrospective timing involve the same or similar processes. (p. 546) While other writers dispute this view (e.g., Block, 1992; Zakay, 1993b) , it is still conceivable that the retrospective judgment of time is determined (at least in part) by what would have been a prospective judgment of time. That is to say, retrospective time estimation could entail reperceiving (imaginally) the required interval. However, it is important to note that although the methods of verbal estimation and reproduction seem to yield the same type of results (e.g., and, indeed, that duration estimations derived from these should be correlated (but note that Bindra & Waksberg, 1956 , Doob, 1971 , and Hornstein & Rotter, 1969 , predict a negative correlation; Zakay, 1993, predicts a positive correlation; and Glicksohn & Ron-Avni, 1997, reported a positive correlation for males and a negative one for females!), it is more likely that reproduction would involve the reperception of the duration than would verbal estimation. The reason for this is that reproduction is probably less biased than verbal estimation, the former invoking less of a memory component (Eisler, 1995) than the latter, while the latter being more susceptible to conceptual anchoring in the translation from an analogical mode to a verbal one (e.g., rounding off to an integer estimation). This reperception hypothesis has gathered a fair degree of support in the spatial domain (for a review, see Algom, 1992) , but to the best of my knowledge has not been put to critical test in the temporal domain. According to the reperception hypothesis, retrieval from memory is an act of reperceiving and thus involves the same type of psychophysical function relating input to output (Algom, 1992) . If perception is governed by a power function with exponent b, then reperception will also be a power function of the transformed data, described by a power function (exponent b) of a power function (exponent b). The exponent of the power function for reperception will therefore be b 2 . Taking a close look at data, the exponents of the power function reported by these authors for prospective (M ϭ 0.60) and retrospective conditions (M ϭ 0.30), using verbal estimation, do conform to the reperception hypothesis (that is, 0.6 squared ϭ 0.36, which is close enough to the observed mean value of 0.30). This possibility is easily accommodated by the multiplicative function for apparent duration described in this article if a retrospective time estimation is based on what would have been a prospective one, with a lower degree of absorption. Admittedly, this is rather speculative. Indeed, I know of not one shred of evidence supporting this argument. On the other hand, this is an idea worth following-up.
Second, one should consider what the relationship of retrospective and prospective conditions are suggested to be. Brown and Stubbs (1992, p. 553) write:
We conceive of retrospective conditions as instances of 'low-resolution timing', in which people process temporal information in an incidental manner. . . . Prospective conditions would represent 'high-resolution timing', where subjects consciously attend to time-in-passing and all available temporal cues, with the consequence that their time judgments are relatively accurate.
Given the fact that prospective conditions, by definition, entail focused attention to the passage of time, it is instructive to compare this idea to one that has been recently expressed in the spatial domain. Tsal (Tsal, Meiran, & Lamy, 1995; Tsal & Shalev, 1996) has applied the attentional spotlight in the spatial domain, looking at line estimation. Tsal and Shalev (1996) suggest that ''. . . the metric for unattended stimuli is composed of larger or rougher units . . . the final output is mediated by rounding up processes, so that the unattended line is systematically perceived as longer than the attended one.'' If line estimation is indeed similar to time estimation, then there seems to be an interesting parallel here: For both domains, attention leads to more accurate estimates (though Prinzmetal & Wilson, 1997 , argue convincingly that attention does not reduce perceived line length, rather results in a reduction in the variance of these judgments). Tsal and Brown would both term this as being ''high-resolution'' processing; inattention invokes ''low-resolution'' processing, or what I have posited as reflecting a change in the attentional quality of absorption. Again, this suggests that Thorndyke (1981) might very well be correct to assume that the same cognitive process underlies both time and distance judgments.
The cognitive-timer model is a processing-time model (Block, 1990) . The actual process entails counting the number of subjective time units which have accumulated during a given interval (Zakay, 1989) . Now, the fact that an analog process (prospective estimation of a temporal interval) can be modeled in terms of a discrete process (counting) is not news (Anderson, 1978; Kosslyn, 1980) . A plausible constraint on the discrete counting process is, however, suggested by this discussion. Given a fast enough rate of flow of these subjective time units, the temporal ''critical flicker rate'' is realized such that what we experience is the motion of time (in a similar vein to apparent motion), referred to here as apparent duration. In order for apparent duration to emerge in a manner similar to our perception of motion, this would necessitate that the rate of flow of the subjective time units be around 10 Hz (i.e., a pulse duration of 100 ms, which corresponds to the ''perceptual moment hypothesis''; cf. Haber & Hershenson, 1973; Patterson, 1990) , even though this notion has been discredited (Patterson, 1990) . A most plausible neurobiological candidate for such a timing process is the EEG alpha rhythm, as it has been for more than 50 years, and the hunt is still on (Geissler, 1992 (Geissler, , 1997 Glicksohn & Myslobodsky, in preparation; Treisman et al., 1994) , even though there does not seem to be supporting empirical evidence.
But one should consider another possibility why there are these interesting parallels between the temporal and spatial domains. Irrespective of process, one should consider the notion that at the representational level, the cognitive representations are similar. In both the spatial and the temporal domains, our mental representations are hierarchically ordered (e.g., Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991; Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Prohaska, 1988; McNamara, 1986; Stevens & Coupe, 1978) . Using this representational similarity as a base, one could suggest that both time estimation and distance estimation are conceptually derived rather than perceptually informed. It would then be a short step to the other models for subjective time that are predominant in the literature (see, Block, 1990 ). An interesting third possibility, however, has been championed by Freyd (1987) , who coins the term ''dynamic mental representation,'' which is ''. . . one in which time is represented analogically, or using Palmer's (1978) terminology, intrinsically. That means that time is represented with a representing dimension that has some of the same inherent structure that real-world time has'' (p. 430). The implication of such a view is that ''. . . time becomes coupled with the spatial dimensions in the representation'' (p. 432). It is conceivable that both representation-dominated and process-dominated models will be shown to converge, fulfilling thereby both necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamic mental representation. The present article conforms to this view and makes a modest step in this direction.
Summary and Conclusions
In this article, I have suggested a refinement of the cognitive-timer model for apparent duration, showing how the number of subjective time units and their size covary. Five interesting conclusions have been drawn along the way. The first conclusion is regarding the strong interplay among attention, arousal, and time perception, which is at the base of the cognitive-timer model. Second, a conclusion can be drawn concerning the notion of a single pool of attention, which can be deployed in an internally oriented or externally oriented manner, with a necessary trade-off between the two (Fig. 1) . Third, a hyperbolic relationship between the number of subjective time units and their size (Fig. 2) is suggested, which deserves research attention. Fourth, the multiplicative function for apparent duration can be explicated using the power law of psychophysics (Fig. 3) and lends itself to systematic analysis. Fifth, the case has been made regarding the common dynamics underlying space perception, motion perception, and time perception.
The major bulk of research on apparent duration has not been concerned with the latter three of these five issues. As this article has attempted to show, the systematic study of these issues may now be mandatory if research on apparent duration is to be integrated into mainstream cognitive psychology.
